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JURISDICTIOi\ o , i Ii£ UTAH SUPREME COURT
The Court of Appeals entered its decision on July 19, 2007. This Court has
jurisdiction to review the Court of Appeals' decision 1: ) * rit :>f cei tiorai i in idei I Jtah
Code *i mi § 78-2-2(3)0 i) i ir I [5 )
OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The opinion, of the Utah Court of Appeals is reported, at 2007 I IT App 249 , 166

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Whether the Court of Appeals misconstrued the standards applicable to temporary
and permanent conditions in premises liability cases.

correctness. Pratt^Jiejson. 2007 U'l 4 : '• ! *. 164 P.3d 360, 372 (Utah 2007,.
CONTROLLING STATUTES AND RULES
Rule 56 of the t Jtah .Rules of Ci \ i.l„ Pi ocedure is the only Rule relevant to the
q

-

;

[Summary judgment] shall be rendered if the plead, . ,
depositions, ansv ers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.
together with the affidavits, if any, *:h,o^ 1\ J there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the mov ing party is entitled to
a judgment as a nailer of law.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition
in the Lower Courts.
This case arises out of a slip-and-fall accident that occurred at the Hickory Kist
Deli ("Hickory Kist") on January 26, 2004 (R. at 290). The plaintiff Donna Jex
commenced a premises liability lawsuit on August 18, 2004 against Hickory Kist and its
owners, James Fillmore and Angela Fillmore, upon the filing of her Complaint in the
Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah County, State of Utah (R. at 4-5).
On January 10, 2006, Hickory Kist and its owners filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment and supporting memorandum (R. at 146-113). Jex filed a Reply Memorandum
Opposing Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment for Plaintiff on February 16, 2006 (R. at 241-155). Hickory Kist and
its owners filed a Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment on
February 24, 2006 (R. at 248-242). They also filed a Memorandum in Opposition to
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on March 14, 2006 (R. at 273-265). Jex filed a
Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff s Motion for Summary Judgment on March
29, 2006 (R. at 279-264). The cross-motions for summary judgment came before the trial
court, the Honorable Judge Derek P. Pullan, and were heard on April 5, 2006 (R. at 291282). The trial court granted the Motion for Summary Judgment of Hickory Kist and its
owners and denied Jex's Motion. Id. The trial court issued a written Ruling on the
judgment on May 2, 2006. Id A copy of the trial court's ruling is included in the
-2-

appendix.
Donna Jex filed a Notice of Appeal on June 16, 2006. The Utah Court of Appeals
heard the matter and issued a decision on July 19, 2007. The opinion is reported at 2007
UT App 249, 166 P.3d 655 (Utah Ct. App. 2007). A copy of the opinion is included in
the appendix.
Hickory Kist filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Utah Supreme Court on
August 14, 2007, and Donna Jex filed a cross-petition on September 13, 2007. The Utah
Supreme Court granted the petition and cross-petition on December 10, 2007.
B. Statement of Facts.
On January 26, 2004, sometime before 8:30 a.m., Donna Jex entered the Hickory
Kist Deli (R. at 290). She was the first customer of the day. Id. While she was shopping,
she slipped in a puddle of water on the hardwood floor and fell to the ground, injuring her
wrist and back (R. at 289).
There had been new snow earlier that morning (R. at 290). James Fillmore, owner
of Hickory Kist, came in the back door of the store at about 5:00 a.m. Id. At about 6:30
a.m. or 7:00 a.m., after removing the snow and spreading ice melt at the front part of the
store, Mr. Fillmore walked through the front door of the store all the way to the back to
start cooking. Id.
At about 5:30 a.m., Sharlene Barber, an employee of Hickory Kist, came into the
store. IdL Sharlene usually turns the lights on but cannot remember turning them on that
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day. Id. At about 7:00 a.m. Sharlene put mats on the floor. Id. At some other time that
morning before any customers had entered the store, a Pepsi delivery man had entered
and walked to the back of the store (R. at 289).
Neither James Fillmore nor Sharlene Barber was aware of the puddle of water on
the store floor before Donna Jex's slip and fall accident (R. at 284). Moreover, Donna
Jex was not aware of the puddle of water until after she slipped in it (R. at 289).
Donna Jex filed suit against Hickory Kist and its owners, James Fillmore and
Angela Fillmore, on August 18, 2004, alleging that Hickory Kist and its owners were
liable for the hazardous condition that Ms. Jex encountered on the store floor (R. at 5-4).
Hickory Kist and its owners filed a motion for summary judgment on January 10, 2006,
arguing inter alia that they were not liable as a matter of law because the puddle of water
that Ms. Jex slipped in was a temporary condition about which Hickory Kist and its
owners had no actual or constructive notice (R. at 146-113).
The trial court, the Honorable Judge Derek P. Pullan, granted Hickory Kist and its
owners' Motion for Summary Judgment, finding that liability could not lie against a
storeowner for a temporary unsafe condition unless the storeowner had actual or
constructive notice (R. at 291-282). The trial court held, inter alia, that since Hickory
Kist and its owners had no actual or constructive notice of the puddle of water before Jex
slipped and fell, Hickory Kist and its owners were entitled to judgment as a matter of law
(R. at 286-284).

-4-

On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling that "neither
Fillmore nor his employees had actual or constructive knowledge of the puddle of water
creating the dangerous condition on Hickory Kist's floor." Jex v. JRA, Inc., 2007 UT
App 249 at f 24, 166 P.3d at 661. However, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court's ruling, holding that Hickory Kist and its owners could be found liable without
notice of the puddle of water, if it were found that Fillmore or his employees created it.
I d at ffl|17-18, 166 P.3d at 659-60.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DECIDED THAT A
STOREOWNER COULD BE FOUND LIABLE FOR A TEMPORARY
UNSAFE CONDITION WITHOUT ANY ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE
NOTICE.
The Court of Appeals misconstrued Utah law when it held that a storeowner may

be liable for a temporary condition that he or his employees create but for which he has
no actual or constructive notice.
In Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, 918 P.2d 476, 478 (Utah 1996), the Utah
Supreme Court held that "the owner of a business is not a guarantor that his business
invitees will not slip and fall. He is charged with the duty to use reasonable care to
maintain the floor of his establishment in a reasonably safe condition for his patrons."
citing Preston v. Lamb, 20 Utah 2d 260, 263, 436 P.2d 1021, 1023 (1968); Martin v.
Safeway Stores, Inc. 565 P.2d 1139, 1140 (Utah 1977). In the present matter, the Utah
Court of Appeals found that there was no evidence that Hickory Kist's owner and
-5-

employees exercised anything less than reasonable care in the maintenance of the floors.
Jex, 2007 UT App 249 atffi[16, 24, 166 P.3d at 659 and 661. Nevertheless, the court
held that Hickory Kist could be found liable even without a finding that they knew or
even should have known of water on the floor of their store. Id. at 117-18, 166 P.3d at
659-60. Such a ruling is erroneous under Utah law.
In the context of a storeowner's liability in slip-and-fall cases, the Utah Supreme
Court has identified two classes of negligence cases:
The first [class] involves some unsafe condition of a
temporary nature, such as a slippery substance on the floor
and usually where it is not known how it got there. In this
class of cases it is quite universally held that fault cannot be
imputed to the defendant so that liability results therefrom
unless two conditions are met: (A) that he had knowledge of
the condition, that is, either actual knowledge, or constructive
knowledge because the condition had existed long enough
that he should have discovered it; and (B) that after such
knowledge, sufficient time elapsed that in the exercise of
reasonable care he should have remedied it.
Schnuphase, 918 P.2d at 478 (citing Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms, Inc., 538 P.2d 175,
176 (Utah 1975)). The court continued:
The second class of cases involves some unsafe condition of a
permanent nature, such as: in the structure of the building, or
of a stairway, etc. or in equipment or machinery, or in the
manner of use, which was created or chosen by the defendant
(or his agents), or for which he is responsible. In such
circumstances, where the defendant either created the
condition, or is responsible for it, he is deemed to know of the
condition; and no further proof of notice is necessary.
Id (citing Allen, 538 P.2d at 176).
-6-

The distinction between the two types of cases is whether the condition is
temporary or permanent. In temporary condition cases, the plaintiff must establish notice.
In permanent condition cases, "where the defendant either created the condition, or is
responsible for it," notice is presumed.
In the present matter, the Utah Court of Appeals held that:
[TJhere is no direct evidence suggesting that the puddle of
water had been there for any significant period of time.
Further, there was nothing about the puddle itself suggesting
that it had been there for a long time. Nor is there any
reasonable inference that the store owner should have been
aware of a four-inch puddle of water on the hardwood floor.
Therefore, we conclude that conjecture and speculation is the
only way to determine the length of time the puddle was on
the floor, and thus, it would be improper to impute
constructive knowledge to Defendants.
Jex, 2007 UT App. 249 at f 16, 166 P.3d at 659. Nevertheless, the court found that
liability could be found under the first (temporary condition) category of cases. Id., at f<f
17-18, 166 P.3d at 659-60. However, the Schnuphase court held that "[u]nder this first
theory, 'the liability of the owner of a store should be established only when the condition
complained of has existed for a long enough time that the owner should have known
about it and corrected it, or has had actual knowledge of the condition complained of.'"
Id at 478, citing Martin, 565 P.2d at 1140.
The court provided a rationale for requiring a finding of notice in Goebel v. Salt
Lake City Southern Railroad Co., 104 P.3d 1185, 1195 (Utah 2004). In Goebel the court
reasoned that "outside of a few conceivable but highly improbable circumstances, a party
-7-

will always have notice of its own actions." Id, Nevertheless, the court stated, "we
believe that failure to repair a defective condition about which one neither knows nor
reasonably should know is neither negligent nor unreasonable. That is why notice is a
requirement in negligence cases such as this one." Id Thus, if there is no notice of a
temporary dangerous condition, there can be no liability. Id.; Allen, 538 P.2d at 176;
Schnuphase, 918 P.2d at 478.
As support for its holding in the present matter, the Utah Court of Appeals cited
Silcox v. Skaggs Alpha Beta, Inc., 814 P.2d 623, 624 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), in holding
that "[ajlthough it is well settled that a store owner must have notice of a dangerous
condition, 'the variant of this rule . . . is that if the condition . . . was created by the
defendant himself or his agents or employees, the notice requirement does not apply.'"
Jex, 2007 UT App. 249 f 17, 166 P.3d at 659, quoting Silcox, 814 P.2d at 624. The quote
from Silcox was taken from Long v. Smith Food King Store, 531 P.2d 360, 361 (Utah
1973), which states in full:
[I]n order to impose liability for an injury resulting from some
foreign substance or defective condition it must have existed
for such time and manner that in due care the defendant either
knew or should have known, and remedied it; and the variant
thereof, that if the condition or defect was created by the
defendant himself or his agents or employees, the notice
requirement does not apply.
Id. The foregoing statement of the law is, of course, correct. It accurately recounts the
first and second categories of liability, for temporary and permanent conditions, as was
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explained in Schnuphase, 918 P.2d at 478. It does not, however, describe two variants of
the first type of liability, dealing with temporary conditions. Accordingly, the Utah Court
of Appeals misapplied Utah law when it construed the foregoing to find that no notice is
required when an owner or employee may have created a temporary unsafe condition.
The Silcox case is distinguishable from the present matter. In that case, a stock
cart filled with bags of melting ice was left in a shopping area. Silcox, 814 P.2d at 623.
Water from the melted ice spread down an aisle, and a patron slipped and fell in the
resulting puddle. Id The Silcox court held that "[a]n inference could readily be drawn
by the jury that the water in which plaintiff fell came from the bags of ice on the cart left
in the aisle by a store employee." Id. at 624-25. Notice in that case was not critical to the
analysis because, as explained in Goebel 104P.3datll95, "outside of a few conceivable
but highly improbable circumstances, a party will always have notice of its own actions."
Certainly, whoever left the stock cart of ice in the shopping aisle in Silcox knew that he or
she had done so. In contrast, in Jex, the Utah Court of Appeals specifically found that the
Hickory Kist employees had no actual or constructive notice of the puddle of water in
which Donna Jex slipped and fell. Jex, 2007 UT App. 249 at ^ 16 and 24, 166 P.3d at
659 and 661. Of course, with no notice of the puddle, the Hickory Kist employees had no
way of remedying the unsafe condition. Accordingly, the Utah Court of Appeals erred
when it held that Hickory Kist could nevertheless be held liable for that condition. Id at
HI 17 and 18.
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A similarly distinguishable case is Campbell v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 15 Utah 2d
113, 388 P.2d 409 (1964). In Campbell the plaintiff tripped over a small empty
cardboard box that had been left in a grocery store aisle, causing her to fall and suffer
injuries. Id. at 114, 388 P.2d at 410. The court found that a jury could reasonably
conclude that it was more likely than not a store employee that negligently left the empty
box in the aisle. Id. at 115-16, 388 P.2d at 410-11. Accordingly, the court found it
unnecessary to determine whether the store checker at the end of the aisle had adequate
time to discover the box and remove it. Id. Just as in Silcox, supra, notice was not at
issue in Campbell because surely the store employee who had left the box in the aisle was
aware when he or she had done so.
In Koerv.Mavfair Markets, 19 Utah 2d 339, 343, 431 P.2d 566, 569 (1967), the
court held that:
In cases such as the present one which involve a loose object
causing one to fall, it is important to distinguish between the
situation where the object causing the injury was placed on the
floor by the employer-store or its employee, or placed there by
some third person. If it is established that the object causing
the injury was placed there by the former, or that they were
aware of its presence, a prima facie case for the jury is
established on the issue of negligence.
Id. The Koer case involved a grape on the floor of a grocery store which caused the
plaintiff to slip and fall. Id at 341, 431 P.2d at 567. However, there was no evidence to
suggest that the grape was put there by a store employee. Id at 343, 431 P.2d at 569.
Accordingly, the Koer case does not discuss whether a storeowner may be found liable
-10-

for a loose object on the ground that an employee may have deposited but where there is a
specific finding that neither the storeowner nor its employee had any actual or
constructive knowledge of its existence. Hickory Kist has not found any cases that
discuss such a scenario. Nevertheless, given the Utah Supreme Court's more recent
discussions of notice in premises liability cases such as Schnuphase and Goebel, supra, a
more fair and consistent ruling should be that a storeowner and its employees should be
found liable if it is shown that they had actual or constructive knowledge of the temporary
unsafe condition. If, as in Silcox and Campbell, supra, actual or constructive notice of the
condition can be inferred from the facts of the case, liability should be found. However,
where there is no actual or constructive knowledge of the condition, there should be no
liability.
In the present matter, the court of appeals found that "there is no direct evidence
indicating who actually caused the water puddle."1 Jex, 2007 UT App 249 at 118, 166
P.3d at 660. Moreover, the court found that "there is no direct evidence suggesting that
the puddle of water had been there for any significant period of time. Further, there was
nothing about the puddle itself suggesting that it had been there for a long time." Id. at ^
16, 166 P.3d at 659. Given those findings, the holding in Schnuphase, 918 P.2d at 478,

1

Even though the court of appeals ultimately held that a jury could reasonably infer that
the puddle was created by Hickory Kist's owner or employee, it observed that "the
evidence suggests that the source of the water puddle could have been Fillmore, Barber,
the Pepsi salesman, or even Jex herself." Id Moreover, it should be acknowledged that
the source of the water puddle may even have been some other source that has not yet
been considered.
-11-

should control, that where it is not known how a temporary, unsafe condition got there, a
storeowner should not be found liable unless he had actual or constructive knowledge of
the condition. To hold otherwise would be fundamentally unfair and contrary to Utah
law. See Goebel, 104 P.3d at 1195 ("failure to repair a defective condition about which
one neither knows nor reasonably should know is neither negligent nor unreasonable").
CONCLUSION
In the present matter, the Utah Court of Appeals erred when it held that Hickory
Kist could be found liable for a temporary unsafe condition about which it neither knew
nor reasonably should have known. Accordingly, the Utah Supreme Court should reverse
the Court of Appeals' decision and affirm the trial court's ruling that Hickory Kist is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
DATED this 7,2-day of January, 2008.
STRONG & HANNI

-

^

^

^

-

Robert L. Janicki
Michael L. Ford
Attorneys for Petitioners
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UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

JUL 2 0 2007
This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.

JUL 1 9 2007

IN THE UTAH COURT OP APPEALS
ooOoo
Donna Jex,

OPINION
(For Official Publication)

Plaintiff and Appellant,

Case No. 20060571-CA

v.
F I L E D
( J u l y 1 9 , 2007)

JRA, Inc., dba Hickory Kist
Deli; James Fillmore; and
Angela Fillmore,

2007 UT App 249~]

Defendants and Appellees.

Fourth District, American Fork Department, 050100121
The Honorable Derek P. Pullan
Attorneys:

Denton ML Hatch, Spanish Fork, for Appellant
Robert L. Janicki and Michael L. Ford, Salt Lake
City, for Appellees

Before Judges Billings, Orme, and Thorne.
BILLINGS, Judge:
Hi
Plaintiff Donna Jex appeals the trial court's order granting
summary judgment in favor of Defendants JRA, Inc, clba Hickory
Kist Deli, James Fillmore, and Angela Fillmore. We affirm in
part and reverse and remand in part.
BACKGROUND
%2
On the morning of January 26, 2004, new snow had just
fallen. James Fillmore, owner of Hickory Kist Deli (Hickory
Kist), arrived at Hickory Kist for work at approximately 5:00
a.m. He entered the store through the back door. At about 5:30
a.m., Sharlene Barber, an employee at Hickory Kist, also arrived
at the store for work. Generally, Barber turns on the store
lights when she first arrives at the store, but Baarber cannot
remember whether she turned the lights on that morning.
i|3
At approximately 6:30 or 7:00 a.m., Fillmore finished
removing snow from outside the front of the store and spreading

ice melt over the front walkways. He then walked through the
front door and proceeded to the back of the store to begin
cooking. Around 7:00 a.m., Barber placed mats on the floor at
the front of the store. Once the mats were down, a person could
walk on the mats from the front door of the store to the cash
register located approximately twenty-five feet away. However,
upon reaching the cash register, a person would have to step off
the mats and onto the hardwood floor to proceed to the back of
the store.
14
Jex came into Hickory Kist sometime before 8:30 a.m. She
was the first customer of the day. However, sometime before Jex'
entered the store, a Pepsi salesman had entered and walked to the
back of the store. When Jex entered the store, she noticed that
the lights in the store were dim, as if some lights had not yet
been turned on. Jex reached the area in the store where the cash
register is located and then turned right to go to the back of
the store. She intended to place an order and noticed that
nobody was at the counter. As she turned, she slipped on the
hardwood floor due to a puddle of water approximately four inches
in diameter.
f5
Although Fillmore did not inspect the floor prior to the
accident that morning, he speculated that the water either came
from his shoes or Jex's shoes. Jex was wearing boots with new,
but small, tread. Fillmore and Barber were both wearing shoes
with deep tread.
1[6
Fillmore knew that for persons wearing hard rubber shoes,
the hardwood floor was slippery when wet. Typically, Fillmore
decides where to place the mats in his store, and although he had
placed a mat in the area where the accident occurred on other
occasions, he did not place a mat there at the time of the
accident because the one he intended to use had a turaed-up edge.
Moreover, Fillmore acknowledged that keeping floors clean and
water free is important; therefore, he instructs employees to
stop what they are doing and take care of the floor if there is
something on the floor. In maintaining the store's cleanliness
throughout the day, Hickory Kist employees are required to
perform various tasks such as wiping down the tables and ensuring
that everything is in proper order for customers. The employees'
daytime tasks do not, however, include periodically mopping the
store floors. Instead, this task is performed at night after the
store is closed.
^7
Jex broke
Hickory Kist.
injuries. Jex
judgment. The

20060571-CA

her wrist and injured her back when she fell in
She filed this lawsuit to recover for her
and Defendants filed cross-motions for summary
trial court granted Defendants1 summary judgment

2

motion and denied Jex's summary judgment motion.
appeals.

Jetx now

ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
t8
Jex argues that the trial court erred when it granted
summary judgment in favor of Defendants, Specifically, Jex
asserts that the trial court erred in holding that she could not
recover under either of the two negligence theories she asserted
against Defendants for the injuries she received from her slipand-fall accident in Hickory Kist. Jex also argues that summary
judgment in this case is improper because issues of material fact
exist* "Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). "On
appeal, we review the district court's ruling on summary judgment
for correctness." Jackson v. Mateus, 2003 UT 18,^6, 70 P.3d 78.
ANALYSIS
^9
In Utah, a business owner is not required to ensure that his
business invitees will not slip and fall. See Martin v. Safeway
Stores, Inc.. 565 P.2d 1139, 1140 (Utah 1977) ("[P]roperty owners
are not insurers of the safety of those who come upon their
property, even though they are business invitees."); Preston v.
Lamb, 20 Utah 2d 260, 436 P.2d 1021, 1023 (1968). Instead, a
business owner "is charged with the duty to use reasonable care
to maintain the floor of his establishment in a reasonably safe
condition for his patrons." S'chnuphase v. Storehouse Mkts.. 918
P.2d 476, 478 (Utah 1996) (quotations and citation omitted).
110 In considering a store owner's duty of reasonable care in
slip-and-fall cases, we note that "slip-and-fall cases have
usually been regarded as falling into . . . two different classes
[of negligence]," Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms. 538 P.2d 175,
176 (Utah 1975). The first class of cases "involves some unsafe
condition of a temporary nature, such as a slippery substance on
the floor T,] and usually . , , it is not known how it got there."
Id. The "second class . , , involves some unsafe condition of a
permanent nature, such as[J in the structure of the building, or
of a stairway, etc. or in equipment . . . or its manner of use,
which was created or chosen by the defendant (or his agents), or
for which he is responsible." Id- Jex argues that she can
recover under either the temporary condition or the permanent
condition theory of liability.
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I.

Temporary Condition

i[ll Jex contends that the trial court erred in determining that
she could not recover under the temporary condition theory.
Under the temporary condition theory, a plaintiff can only
recover if the defendant has notice of the dangerous condition.
Specifically, the following two conditions must be satisfied:
(1) "that [the defendant] had knowledge of the condition, that
is, either actual knowledge[] or constructive knowledge because
the condition had existed long enough that he should have
discovered it; and [(2)3 that after such knowledge, sufficient
time elapsed that in the exercise of reasonable care he should
have remedied it." Id, "The variant of this rule, however, is
'that if the condition . . . was created by the defendant himself
or his agents or employees, the notice requirement does not
apply.™ Silcox v, Skaaas Alpha Beta, Inc., 814 P.2d 623, 624
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) (quoting Loner v. Smith Food King Store, 531
P.2d 360, 361 (Dtah 1973)). Therefore, "it is important to
distinguish between the situation where the [condition] causing
the injury was [created] . , . by the employer-store or its
employee, or [was created] by some third person.M Koer v.
Mayfair Mkts.. 19 Utah 2d 339, 431 P.2d 566, 569 (1967).
A.

Temporary Condition Created by a Third Person

Hl2 First, regarding whether Fillmore or his employees had
notice of a dangerous condition created by a third party,1 it is
undisputed that neither Fillmore nor his employees had actual
knowledge that there was water on the store's hardwood floors.
Instead, Jex asserts that they had constructive notice because
the water was on the floor long enough that the owner or
employees should have discovered it. See Schnuphase, 918 P.2d at
478.

1. We address Jex's legal argument that Fillmore or Barber had
notice of the puddle of water on the floor based solely on the
fact that a Pepsi salesman entered the store prior to Jex
entering the store. Otherwise, our analysis would be
unnecessary. The notice requirement is only at issue if the
puddle of water was created by some third person. Since Jex was
Hickory Kist's first customer of the day, the only persons who
could have created the puddle of water were Jex, Fillmore,
Barber, or the Pepsi salesman. Without the Pepsi salesman's
entrance into Hickory Kist, there would be no other third person
that could have caused the puddle of water on the floor.
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1l3 Although Utah case law does not lay out precise factors for
determining whether a store owner2 had constructive notice of a
dangerous condition, it does establish that constructive notice
is imputed when "the condition had existed long enough that [the
store owner] should have discovered it." Id, "Thus, the
importance of the time factor to the issue of constructive notice
is clear." R.D. Hursh, Annotation, Liability of Proprietor of
Store> Office, or Similar Business Premises for Injury from Fall
on Floor Made Slippery by Tracked-in or Spilled Water, Oil, Mud,
Snow, and the Like, 62 A>L.R-2d 6, § 7b (1958). To establish
that a temporary condition existed long enough to give a store
owner constructive notice of it, a plaintiff must present
evidence that "would show from the condition of the debris on the
floor that it had been there for an[] appreciable time." Ohlson
v. Safeway Stores, I n c . 568 P.2d 753, 754 {Utah 1977).
Constructive notice cannot be grounded on speculation or mere
allegation. See Lindsay v. Eccles Hotel Co,. 3 Utah 2d 364, 284
P.2d 477, 478 (1955) ("[A] jury cannot be permitted to speculate
that the defendant was negligent,"); cf. Koer, 431 P.2d at 570
("[A] mere fall does not prima facie establish a jury
question.").
1114 In determining whether a store owner had constructive notice
of a dangerous condition, we look to various Utah slip-and-fall
cases. In Lindsay v. Eccles Hotel Co., 3 Utah 2d 364, 284 P.2d
477, 478 (1955), the plaintiff slipped and fell on a small
quantity of water on the floor in the defendant's coffee shop.
See id. at 478. The water "somehow got on the floor some time
after [the plaintiff] was seated." Id. The court found that the
plaintiff could not recover because "there was no evidence as to
how the water got onto the floor, by whom it was deposited,
exactly when it arrived there or that the defendant had knowledge
of its presence," Id. Similarly, in Koer v. Mayfair Markets, 19
Utah 2d 339, 431 P.2d 566 (1967), the court determined that a
plaintiff could not recover after she slipped and fell on a grape
found on the floor of a grocery store. See id. at 569-70. The
court reasoned that from the evidence, it was unable "to find any
support for the further and necessary inference that th[e
dangerous] condition was caused by an act of the defendant,* or
that the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of it."
Id. at 569. And in Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms, Inc., 538
P.2d 175 (Utah 1975), the court found that a plaintiff could not
recover from injuries he sustained after he slipped and fell on
some cottage cheese on a store floor. See id. at 177. The court
noted that there was "no evidence, nor any basis from which a

2. For the sake of convenience, our analysis regarding a store
owner also encompasses a store owner's employees and agents.
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fair inference could be drawn, that the defendant had knowledge
of the cottage cheese on the floor," Id.
<fl5 In contrast, in Qhlson v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 568 P. 2d 753
{Utah 1977), the Utah Supreme Court determined that it was
reasonable for a jury to find that a store owner had constructive
notice of a dangerous condition in the store. See id. at 754-55.
In that case, the plaintiff slipped and fell on some dry
spaghetti on a grocery store floor. See id. at 754. According
to the evidence presented at trial, "the spaghetti was dirty,
crushed, broken into small pieces, and . . . extended from aisle
ten around the end of that aisle into the main aisle for five or
six feet toward the cash register at the front of the store.11
Id. The evidence also indicated that "a casual glance down the'
aisle" forty-five minutes before the accident was the only
inspection of the store floor during the store's busiest time of
day. Id. at 755. Moreover, the aisle in which the spaghetti was
strewn was visible from the cash register. See id. Affirming
the jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff, the supreme court
concluded that the evidence supported a jury finding that the
dangerous condition had existed for some time, and that the store
owner had constructive notice of the condition. See id.
H16 In this case, there is no direct evidence suggesting that
the puddle of water had been there for any significant period of
time. Further, there was nothing about the puddle itself
suggesting that it had been there for a long time. Nor is there
any reasonable inference that the store owner should have been
aware of a four-inch puddle of water on the hardwood floor.
Therefore, we conclude that conjecture and speculation is the
only way to determine the length of time the puddle was on the
floor, and thus, it would be improper to impute constructive
notice to Defendants.
B.

Temporary Condition Created by Hickory Kistrs Owner
or Employee

fl7 Second, Jex argues that even if Defendants did not have
constructive notice of the dangerous condition, she can still
recover under the temporary condition theory because either
Fillmore or Barber themselves created the condition. Although it
is well settled that a store owner must have notice of a
dangerous condition, "[t]he variant of this rule . . . is that if
the condition . . . was created by the defendant himself or his
agents or employees, the notice requirement does not apply."
Silcox v. Skagcrs Alpha Beta, Inc., 814 P.2d 623, 624 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991) (quotations and citation omitted).. In Silcox v.
Skaacrs Alpha Beta, Inc», 814 P.2d 623 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), the
plaintiff slipped and fell on some water that came from melting
bags of ice stacked on a stocking cart. See id. at 624. The
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court found that a reasonable inference could be draiwn that a
cart for stacking groceries was left by a store employee,
creating a foreseeable risk of harm. See id, at 624-25.
Hl8 Again, in this case, there is no direct evidence indicating
who actually caused the water puddle. Still, in Silcox we
determined that " [i]t is for the jury to decide, even if only as
a matter of inference, whether one of [a3 defendant [*s) employees
created the risk of harm." Id, at 625 {emphasis added). In this
case, the evidence suggests that the source of the water puddle
could have been Fillmore, Barber, the Pepsi salesman, or even Jex
herself. However, we note that while Jex was wearing boots with
small tread, both Fillmore and Barber were wearing shoes with
deep tread. Moreover, we note that Jex was the first customer of
the day and slipped shortly after she entered Hickory Kist.
Based on this evidence, a jury could reasonably infer that the
puddle of water on the floor was caused by Fillmore or one of his
employees, and thus, we reverse and remand as to the issue of
whether Hickory Kist's owner or employee created the puddle of
water.
II.

Permanent Condition

1|l9 Next, Jex asserts that she could recover under the permanent
condition theory of liability because Hickory Kist used a wood
floor that it knew was slippery when it became wet cind because
Fillmore failed to direct his store employees to use mats in
areas of high customer traffic. Under this theory of liability,
the dangerous condition must be both inherently dangerous and
foreseeable. See Schnuphase v. Storehouse Mkts., 9l8 P.2d 476,
477 (Utah 1996).
120 In Canfield v. Albertsons, Inc., 841 P.2d 1224 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992), the plaintiff slipped on a piece of lettuce in a
grocery store. See id. at 1225. The store displayed its lettuce
as a "farmer's pack," meaning that the lettuce did not have its
wilted leaves removed. Id. The store placed empty boxes on the
floor where customers could place the discarded lettuce leaves.
See id. This court determined that w [i]t was reasonably
foreseeable that some leaves would fall or be dropped on the
floor by customers thereby creating a dangerous condition." Id,
at 1227.
^21 This same theory--that a store owner is liable for injuries
caused by a foreseeable, inheirently dangerous condition in the
store--was addressed in Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, 918
P.2d 476, 478 {Utah 1996). However, in Schnuphase, the Utah
Supreme Court limited the Canfield holding, noting that
"[cjentral to [the court's] finding in Canfield was the
determination that [the store] had notice of the potentially
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hazardous condition, as evidenced by the storeTs placement of
empty boxes and its instituting a regular schedule for inspecting
and cleaning the produce section" of the store. Id. at 479, It
emphasized that "inherent danger and foreseeability remain
essential elements of the claim," id., and suggested some concern
about extending a store owner's liability in method of operation
cases, see id.; Babbitt v. 7-Eleven Sales Corp., 2000 UT App SOU
(mem.) (indicating that the Schnuphase court "expressed concern
with extending store owner liability in method of operation
cases")•
^[22 In Schnuphase, the plaintiff was injured when she slipped
and fell on some ice cream that was on the floor in the deli
section of the defendant's store. See id, at 477. The plaintiff
claimed that the defendant failed to take the proper
precautionary measures to ensure the store floor remained clear
and safe for store customers. See id. at 479. The court
concluded that the "plaintiff failed to present sufficient
evidence on a claim of negligent mode of operation and that
reasonable minds could not differ on the question of whether [the
store owner] took reasonable precautions to protect its
customers." Id.
K23 In this case, given the limiting effect of Schnuphase and
the lack of direct evidence indicating that Defendants chose a
method of operation that was inherently dangerous and
foreseeable, we conclude that Defendants were not negligent.
Unlike the defendant in Canfield, Defendants did not have notice
that they created a potentially hazardous condition.3
CONCLUSION
K24 Under the temporary condition theory of negligence, we
affirm the trial court's holding that neither Fillmore nor his
employees had actual or constructive knowledge of the puddle of
water creating the dangerous condition on Hickory Kist's floor.
However, we reverse and remand as to whether Fillmore or his
employees created the puddle of water. As to the permanent
condition theory'of negligence, we affirm the trial court's
ruling that there is no evidence suggesting that Fillmore "chose
a method of operation that created an inherently dangerous

3. Based on our prior discussion, we do not find issues of
material fact that preclude summary judgment, except as to
whether the Hickory Kist store owner or employee created the
puddle of water.

20060571-CA

8

condition, and that the inherently dangerous condition was
foreseeable."

JudZth M. Billings, Judge

v

!5 WE CONCUR:

Gre goryltT"" 6rme, Judge

William A. Thome, Judge
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RULING ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

DONNA JEX
Plaintiff,

v.

Case No. 050100121

JRA, INC. dba HICKORY KIST DELI, JAMES
FILLMORE and ANGELA FILLMORE,

Judge Derek P. Pullan

Defendants.

This matter comes before the Court on the parties* Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. On
April 5,2006, the Court heard oral argument The Plaintiff Donna Jex was represented by Mr. Denton
M. Hatch. The Defendants JRA, INC, dba Hickory Kist Deli, James Fillmore, and Angela Fillmore
("Defendants" or "Hickory Kist5') were represented by Mr. Michael L. Ford.
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After carefully considering the arguments and the law presented, the Court enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
On the morning of January 26,2004, there was new snow on the ground. James Fillmore, owner
of Hickory Kist, arrived at work around 5:00 am. and entered through the backidoor After
removing snow and spreading ice melt in front of the store, he walked in the front door and
walked to the back of the store to begin cooking. This occurred around 6:30 or;7:00 a,m.
An employee of Hickory Kist, Sharlene Barber, entered the store around 5:30 a:m. Around 7:00
a.m. she placed mats on the floor
As part, of her daily routine in opening the store, Barber turns on the lights, but cannot
specifically remember turning on the lights that morning.
Barber believes that only she and Fillmore were in the area where the accident occurred before
the Plaintiff.
Barber stated that there is never water on the floor in the mornings. She did not inspect for water
and never has inspected for water in the morning. Because of her cooking and other
responsibilities, it is unlikely she would have noticed water on thefloorby chance.
Barber was working behind the front counter at the time of the accident. The place where the
accident occurred is about 8 feet infrontof the counter. Standing behind the counter, one can
see the place where the accident occurred.
Plaintiff Donna Jex came into the store prior to 8:30 a.m. and was the first customer-that day.
When Jex entered the store, the lights were dim as if some had not been turned on,
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8.

Before Jex entered that morning, a Pepsi salesman had come in and walked to tlie back of the
store.

9.

When a/person comes into the front door of the store, he or she walks across about 25ifeet of
mats before he or she arrives at the cash register, With the cash register on the left, the person
can step off the mats to go to the back of the store on the hardwood floor.

10.

When Jex reached the area of the cash register, she turned to the right to go to the back of the
store. She intended to make a large order and saw no one at the front counter. As she turned,
she slipped on the floor.

11.

As she was falling, Jex saw a puddle of water about 4 inches in diameter on the floor which
caused her to fall.

12.

While Fillmore did not inspect the floor prior to the accident that morning, he speculated that the
water either came from his shoes or Jex's shoes. After the accident he inspected the area and
found a small amount of water on Jex's boots and on the floor. He opined that there rwas a 90%
chance*the water came from Jex's shoes.

13.

Jex was wearing boots with new, but small, tread.

14.

Fillmore was wearing Asics or Adidas athletic shoes. Barber was wearing Skechers J>rand shoes
with thick soles.

15.

The owners of the store knew that for persons wearing hard rubber shoes, the hardwood floor
was slippery when wet.

'16,

There were no warning signs that the floor is slippery when wet
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17.

There were no mats in the aisle areas. Fillmore decides where to place the matsi He Had
previously placed a mat in the area where the accident occurred, but a mat was not there at the
time of the accident.

\ 8.

Employees were not given formal instruction or training on inspecting the floors. However,
keeping floors clean and water free is an important issue. Employees are instructed that if there
is something on the floor, to drop what they are doing and take care of the floor. Employees
wipe the tables throughout the day and ensure that everything is in proper ordeii for customers.

19.

The store floors are cleaned at night after the store is closed.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A party is entitled to summary judgment when there are no genuine issues of material fact and

that party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). The court is to view all the
facts and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Bowen v. Riverton Citv, 656 P.2d 434,436 (Utah 1982). In opposing a motion for
summary judgment, the plaintiff still has the ultimate burden of proving the elements of his or her cause
of action. "When a party fails to make a sufficient showing of an element essential to the party's
casc.there can be no genuine issue of material fact since a complete failure of proof concerning an
essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial" Celotex
Comv.Catrett 477 U.S. 317,321 (1986).
A store owner "is not a guarantor that his business invitees will not slip and fall.** Merino v.
Albertsons. Inc.. 975 P.2d 467,468 (Utah 1999); Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets^ 918 R2d 476> 478
(Utah 1996) fquoting Preston v. Lamb. 20 Utah 2d 260, 436 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1968). Accordingly,
4

the Utah Supreme Court has "recognized only two legal theories under which a plaintiff may recover
against a business owner for injuries arising from a slip-and-fall accident" Id.
The first theory involves unsafe conditions of a temporary nature. The store owner must have
either actual or constructive knowledge of the unsafe condition:
The first [class] involves some unsafe condition of a temporary nature, such as a slippery
substance on thefloorand usually where it is not known how it got there. In this class of cases it
is quite universally held that fault cannot be imputed to the defendant so that liability results
therefrom unless two conditions are met: (A) that he had knowledge of the condition,'that is,
either actual knowledge, or constructive knowledge because the condition had existed long
enough that he should have discovered it; and (B) that after such knowledge, sufficient time
elapsed that in the exercise of reasonable care he should have remedied it.
Schuohase. 918 P.2d at 478 (quoting Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms. Inc., 538 P.2d 175,176 (Utah
1975) The second theory involves unsafe conditions of a permanent nature and is based on the store
owner creating the hazardous condition:
The second class of cases involves some unsafe condition of a permanent nature, such as: in the
structure of the building, or of a stairway, etc. or in equipment or machinery, or in the manner of
use, which was created or chosen by the defendant (or his agents), or for which he isjresponsible.
In such circumstances, where the defendant either created the condition, or is responsible for it,
he is deemed to know of the condition; and no further proof of notice is necessary.
Schuphase. 918 P.2d at 478 (quoting Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms. Inc., 538 P.2d 175,176 (Utah
2975).
Where a store owner's method of operation creates an unsafe condition, the condition must have
been foreseeable and inherently dangerous. Schnunhase. 918 P.2d at 479; see also, Long v! Smith Food
King Store. 531 P.2d 360,362 (Utah 1973) (essential element in method of operation claim's is that
condition created by defendant is of such character that defendant has or should have! notice of inherently
dangerous condition). For purposes of analysis, method of operation claims are treated as being a
5

permanent condition. Id
DECISION
Temporary Condition
Case law is clear that where an unsafe condition is temporary, the store owner must have had
actual or constructive knowledge of the condition, and had time to remedy it, A review of the case law
applying the temporary condition theory is instructive
In Lindsay v Eccles Hotel Company, 282 P.2d 477 (Utah 1955), the plaintiff slipped'in a small
quantity of water on the floor of a coffee shop. Evidence indicated that a waitress had'delivered water to
plaintiff and her companion. However, the court found there was no evidence whether the waitress, the
plaintiff, her companion, or other patrons spilled water, when it was spilled, or whether management
knew of its existence. The court ruled that "[ujnder such circumstances, a jury cannot be permitted to
speculate that the defendant was negligent"
In Koerv Mavfair Markets. 431 P.2d 566 (Utah 1967), the plaintiff slipped on a grape in
defendant's store. There was no evidence to show the store knew or should have known of any
hazardous condition, or that it had a reasonable opportunity to remedy the condition.
In Long v Smith Food King Store, 531 P.2d 360 (Utah 1973), the store was giving away small
samples of pumpkin pie topped with whipped cream. Plaintiff slipped on one of the pieces 'of pumpkin
pie. There was no evidence that a store employee or anyone else saw pie on floor prior to afccident
Plaintiff argued that the manner in which the samples were distributed was inherently dangerous because
of the likelihood that the slippery substance would be dropped on the floor. The court found that the
defendant did not have notice that the foreign substance was on the floor for sufficient time that in due
6

care it should have been removed. The court rejected plaintiffs argument that giving away samples of
pie was inherently dangerous.
In Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms. Inc., 538 P.2d 175 (Utah 1975), the plaintiff slipped on
cottage cheese that was being given out as a sample. Neither the plaintiff, his wife, nor any of the store
personnel saw pottage cheese on the floor prior to the accident. The only way to determine how it got
there and for how long it had been on the floor was by inference and conjecture. Id. at: 175. The plaintiff
argued that the method by which the store handed out the cottage cheese made it foreseeable;that
customers would spill it on the floor. The court summarily ruled that there was "no showing of any
dangerous condition of a permanent nature." Id. at 177.
In Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets^ 918 P.2d 476 (Utah 1996), the plaintiffislipped on a scoop
of ice cream that another customer had dropped. The plaintiff claimed the store was negligent for not
talcing adequate precautionary measures to prevent or warn of such hazards. The court ruled that there
was "no evidence or any basis from which a fair inference could be drawn that Storehouse Markets
should have realized that there was ice cream on the floor or that it had the opportunity to remove it."
Id. at 478. Plaintiff relied on Canfield v. Albertsons. Inc. 841 P.2d 1224 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) to argue
that the store's method of operation created a situation where it was reasonably foreseeable! that the
expectable acts of third parties would create a dangerous condition or defect. The court distinguished
Canfield and ruled that the plaintiff had not produced evidence of foreseeability of an inherently
dangerous condition. Id. at 479. See below.
Finally, in Merino v. Albertsons, Inc., 975 P.2d 467 (Utah 1999), the plaintiff slipped on a kiwi,
and a year later slipped on a jalapeno at the same store. The court found that the case did not involve
7

"an unsafe condition of a permanent, or even semi-permanent, nature... There is no testimony that the
floor was permanently covered with fruit or vegetable debris.*.In short, this is a case arising from an
unsafe condition of a temporary nature." Id at 468. The plaintiff failed to provide evidence that
Albertsons knew or should have known of the presence of the kiwi or jalapeno.
Plaintiff cannot recover under the first theory of liability. It is undisputed that no store employee
had actual knowledge of water on the floor. Hickory Kist cleaned the floors at night after the store
closed. Water did not collect or pool in the area of the accident that would suggest the area was
frequently wet. Plaintiff acknowledges that she did not see water on the floor before she slipped. "Thus
the only way to determine how it got there, or how long it had been there, is by inference and
conjecture." Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms. 538 P.2d 175,175 (Utah 1975).
Permanent Condition
Plaintiff concedes that the water on the floor of Hickory Kist was not a permanent condition, but
contends that the store's method of operation created an inherently dangerous condition that was
foreseeable. Method of operation is analyzed under the permanent condition theory of storeowner
liability in slip-and-fall cases. Schnuphase* 918 P.2d at 479 (citing Long v. Smith Fobd King Store. 531
P2d at 362); Canfield v. Albertsons. Inc.. 841 P.2d 1224,1226 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (the second theory
of slip-and-fall cases or permanent condition theory governs the case).
Plaintiff argues that De Weese v. J.C. Pennev Company. 5 Utah 2d 116, 297 P.2d 898 (Utah
1956), and Canfield support her position.
In De Weese. the plaintiff slipped in the entrance of defendant's store. It had'been snowing for at
least ten minutes and for up to half an hour before plaintiff entered the store. The floor was wet and
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muddy, and there were no rubber mats or abrasives on the floor The De Weese court noted that this was
not a temporary condition. The entrance to the store was "terrazzo surfacing" which was "pah of the
permanent structure of the building." 297 P 2d at 901. "The evidence clearly show[ed] that the
defendant knew of the characteristic of terrazzo to become slippery when wet, and that it was its custom,
and the custom of other stores with similar surfacing to use rubber mats or grit 1o prevent slipperiness
during stormy weather." Id. In upholding the jury verdict, the court noted that there was sufficient
evidence for a jury to conclude that it had been raining for a long enough period of tinie that defendant
should have employed its safety measures.
In Canfield v. Albertsons^ the Utah Court of Appeals overturned the trial court's grant of
summary judgment to defendant Plaintiff slipped on a piece of lettuce. The heads of lettuce were being
displayed in what is known as a "farmer's pack," in which the lettuce arrives from the farm without the
damaged leaves being removed. Customers often removed and discarded the leaves from the lettuce
they intended to purchase. Albertsons knew of this problem and placed empty boxes around the display
for customers to discard the leaves and regularly patrolled the area. The Court of Appeals found that
Albertsons chose a method of display where third parties would remove lettuce leaves and discard them.
u

It was reasonably foreseeable that under this method of operation some leaves would fall or be dropped

on the floor by customers thereby creating a dangerous condition." Id. at 1227.
The Utah Supreme Court in Schnuphase limited the holding and precedential weigKt of Canfield.
Schnuphase held that u[c]entral to itsfindingin Canfield was the court of appeals' determination that
Albertsons had notice of the potentially hazardous condition.,," 918 P.2d at 479 (emphasis added).
Schnuphase ruled that a plaintiff must show that the inherently dangerous condition y/as foreseeable, and
9

expressed concern with extending store owner liability in method of operation cases. See also, Babbitt
v. 7-Eleven Sales Corporation dba 7-Eleven Food Stores Corporation. 2000 UT App. 50 (notjfor official
publication) (plaintiff slipped on mayonnaise packet on handicap ramp outside its store).
In the instant case there is no evidence that Hickory Kist chose a method of operation)that created
an inherently dangerous condition, and that the inherently dangerous condition was foreseeable. Unlike
the defendant in Canfield. Hickory Kist did not have notice that it had created a potentially hazardous
condition.
CONCLUSION
It is regrettable that Ms. Jex suffered injuries. However, "not every accident that occurs gives
rise to a cause,of action upon which the party injured may recover damages from someone. (Thousands
of accidents occur everyday for which no one is liable in damages, and often no one is to blame."
Schnuphase. 918 P.2d at 479-80, quoting, Martin v. Safewav Stores Inc.. 565 P.2d 1139,1142 (Utah
1977).
Based on the foregoing, the Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted, and the
Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is denied. The Court requests counsel for Defend&nt to
prepare an order consistent with this decision*
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